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Contagion from the global crisis necessitated use of ﬁ scal stimulus measures in India 
during 2008-10 in order to contain a major slowdown in economic growth. Given the usual 
downward inﬂ exibility of ﬁ scal deﬁ cit once it reaches a high level, as has been experienced 
by India in the past, there could be medium-term implications for the future inﬂ ation path, 
which must be recognised while designing the timing and speed of ﬁ scal exit. Inﬂ ation, at 
times, may become effectively a ﬁ scal phenomenon, since the ﬁ scal stance could inﬂ uence 
signiﬁ cantly the overall monetary conditions. As highlighted in this paper, ﬁ scal deﬁ cit 
could be seen to inﬂ uence the inﬂ ation process either through growth of base money created 
by the RBI (i.e. net RBI credit to the Government) or through higher aggregate demand 
associated with an expansionary ﬁ scal stance (which could increase growth in broad 
money). Empirical estimates of this paper conducted over the sample period 1953-2009 
suggest that one percentage point increase in the level of the ﬁ scal deﬁ cit could cause about 
a quarter of a percentage point increase in the Wholesale Price Index (WPI).   The paper 
emphasises  that the potential inﬂ ation risk should work as an important motivating factor 
to ensure a faster return to the ﬁ scal consolidation path in India, driven by quality of 
adjustment with appropriate rationalisation of expenditure, rather than waiting for revenue 
buoyancy associated with sustained robust growth to do  the job automatically. The 
importance of ﬁ scal space in the India speciﬁ c context needs to be seen in terms of not only 
the usual output stabilisation role of ﬁ scal policy but also the occasional need for use of 
ﬁ scal measures to contain such inﬂ ationary pressures that may arise from temporary but 
large supply shocks.
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Introduction
Fiscal stimulus emerged as the key universal instrument of hope in 
almost every country around the world, when the ﬁ nancial crisis in the 
advanced economies snowballed into a synchronised global recession. 
Borrowing as much at as low a cost as possible to stimulate the sinking 
economies necessitated unprecedented coordination between the ﬁ scal 
and monetary authorities. It is the ﬁ scal stance of the Governments 
that had to be accommodated without any resistance by the monetary 
authorities so as to minimise the adverse effects of the crisis on output 
and employment, while also saving the ﬁ nancial system from a complete 
breakdown. Given the deﬂ ation concerns in most countries –rather than 
the fear of inﬂ ation – monetary authorities had no reasons to resist. The 
universal resort to   ﬁ scal stimulus, however, has now led to signiﬁ cant 
increase in deﬁ cit and debt levels of the advanced economies, which 
may operate as a permanent drag for some time, vitiating the overall 
macroeconomic outlook, including inﬂ ation. OECD projections indicate 
that OECD level ﬁ scal deﬁ cit may reach 60 year high of about 8 per 
cent of GDP in 2010, and public debt may exceed 100 per cent of GDP 
in 2011, which will be 30 percentage points higher than the comparable 
pre-crisis levels in 2007. In the process of managing the ﬁ nancial crisis, 
ﬁ scal imbalances have been allowed to reach levels that could trigger 
ﬁ scal crisis in several countries. The market perception of sovereign 
risk has changed signiﬁ cantly in 2010, particularly since the time that 
the ﬁ scal crisis in Greece has surfaced and contaminated the Euro-area. 
The same private sector that was bailed out at the cost of ﬁ scal excesses 
will now perceive Government papers as risky and ﬁ scal imbalances as 
the harbinger of the next crisis. 
In India, the ﬁ scal response to the global crisis was swift and 
signiﬁ cant, even though India clearly avoided a ﬁ nancial crisis at home 
and also continued to be one of the fastest growing economies in the 
World in a phase of deep global recession. Despite the absence of any 
need to bailout the ﬁ nancial system, it is the necessity to partly offset the 
impact of deceleration in private consumption and investment demand 
on economic growth, which warranted adoption of an expansionary ﬁ scal 
stance. One important consequence of this, though, was the signiﬁ cant 
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deviation from the ﬁ scal consolidation path, and the resultant increase 
in the ﬁ scal deﬁ cit levels over two consecutive years (2008-10). 
The immediate impact of the higher levels of ﬁ scal deﬁ cit on 
inﬂ ation in India could be seen as  almost negligible, since: (a) the 
expansionary ﬁ scal stance was only a partial offset for the deceleration 
in private consumption and investment demand, as  the output-gap 
largely remained negative, indicating no risk to inﬂ ation in the near-
term; and (b) despite large increase in the borrowing programme of 
the Government to ﬁ nance the deﬁ cit, there was no corresponding 
large expansion in money growth, since demand for credit from the 
private sector remained depressed. Thus, neither aggregate demand 
nor monetary expansion associated with larger ﬁ scal deﬁ cits posed any 
immediate concern on the inﬂ ation front. The usual rigidity of deﬁ cit 
to correct from high levels to more sustainable levels in the near-term, 
however, entails potential risks for the future inﬂ ation path of India, 
which may become visible when the demand for credit from the private 
sector reverts to normal levels and if the revival in capital ﬂ ows turns 
into a surge again over a sustained period, that may require sterilised 
intervention. The major risk to future inﬂ ation would arise from how 
the extra debt servicing could be ﬁ nanced while returning to sustainable 
levels through planned consolidation.  Revenue buoyancy associated 
with the recovery in economic activities to a durable high growth path 
would only contribute one part; the major important part, however, has 
to come either from a combination of higher taxes, withdrawal of tax 
concessions and moderation in public expenditure, which could weaken 
growth impulses or from higher inﬂ ation tax, suggesting higher money 
growth and associated pressure on future inﬂ ation.
Conceptually, the risk to inﬂ ation from high ﬁ scal deﬁ cit arises 
when ﬁ scal stimulus is used to prop up consumption demand, rather 
than to create income yielding assets through appropriate investment, 
which could have serviced the repayment obligations arising from 
larger debt. As highlighted by Cochrane (2009) in the context of the 
US, “...If the debt corresponds to good quality assets, that are easy...If 
the new debt was spent or given away, we’re in more trouble. If the debt 
will be paid off by higher future tax rates, the economy can be set up for 
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a decade or more of high-tax and low-growth stagnation. If the Fed’s 
kitty and the Treasury’s taxing power or spending-reduction ability are 
gone, then we are set up for inﬂ ation.” It may be worth recognising that 
all over the world, at some stage, the risk of active anti-inﬂ ationary 
policy conﬂ icting with inﬂ exible ﬁ scal exit cannot be ruled out. As 
highlighted by Davig and Leeper (2009) in this context for the US, 
“...as inﬂ ation rises due to the ﬁ scal stimulus, the Federal Reserve 
combats inﬂ ation by switching to an active stance, but ﬁ scal policy 
continues to be active....In this scenario, output, consumption and 
inﬂ ation are chronically higher, while debt explodes and real interest 
rates decline dramatically and persistently”. 
The future risks to inﬂ ation in India from ﬁ scal stimulus, thus could 
arise from the downward inﬂ exibility of the deﬁ cit levels, and with 
revival in demand for credit from the private sector and consolidation 
of growth around the potential, the ﬁ scal constraint could be manifested 
in the form of pressures on both aggregate demand and money supply. 
Surges in capital ﬂ ows could complicate the situation further. This paper 
recognises the possible policy challenge arising from higher money 
growth on account of persistent ﬁ scal constraint, revival in private credit 
demand and surges in capital ﬂ ows, on the one hand, and higher policy 
interest rate chasing higher inﬂ ation on the other. Possible crowding-out 
effects associated with the ﬁ scal constraint may also lead to a situation 
where high inﬂ ation and high nominal interest rates co-exist. Since 
much of these possibilities could be empirically validated over time 
depending on what outcome actually may materialise in the future, this 
paper not only recognises the potential risks to the future inﬂ ation path, 
but also aims at unravelling the relevance of the perception by studying 
the relationship between ﬁ scal deﬁ cit and inﬂ ation in India over the 
sample period 1953 to 2009.
Macroeconomic variables are generally interrelated in a complex 
manner. Therefore, a deeper understanding of inﬂ ation dynamics would 
involve analysing its relationship with macroeconomic variables such 
as deﬁ cit, money supply, public debt, external balance, exchange rate, 
output gap, global inﬂ ation and commodity prices, and interest rates. 
In the literature, particularly in the developing country context, simple 
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models are, however, often used to analyse the inﬂ ationary impact of 
ﬁ scal deﬁ cit. This largely reﬂ ects the role of ﬁ scal dominance, which 
has often been a phenomenon in many developing countries. Thus, 
ﬁ scal-based theories of inﬂ ation are more common in the literature of 
developing countries (for example, Aghevli and Khan (1978), Alesina 
and Drazen (1978) and Calvo and Vegh (1999)). On the other hand, for 
developed countries, ﬁ scal policy is often considered to be unimportant 
for inﬂ ation determination, at least on theoretical grounds, as the desire 
to obtain seigniorage revenue plays no obvious role in the choice of 
monetary policy (Woodford, 2001). 
In the Indian context also, there are several studies analysing the 
nexus between government deﬁ cits, money supply and inﬂ ation. The 
ﬁ ndings of these studies generally point to a self perpetuating process 
of deﬁ cit-induced inﬂ ation and inﬂ ation-induced deﬁ cit, besides the 
overall indication that government deﬁ cits represent an important 
determinant of inﬂ ation (for example, Sarma (1982), Jhadav (1994) and 
Rangarajan and Mohanty (1998)). The above results have been on the 
expected lines given that till the complete phasing out of the ad hoc 
treasury bills in 1997-98, a sizable portion of the government deﬁ cit 
which could not be ﬁ nanced through market subscription was monetised. 
However, extending the period of analysis further beyond the automatic 
monetisation phase, Ashra et al (2004) found no-long relationship 
between ﬁ scal deﬁ cit and net RBI credit to the Government and the 
latter with broad money supply. Thus, they concluded that there is no 
more any rationale for targeting ﬁ scal deﬁ cit as a tool for stabilisation. 
On the other hand, Khundrakpam and Goyal (2009), including more 
recent data and adopting ARDL approach to cointegration analysis, 
found that government deﬁ cit continues to be a key factor causing 
incremental reserve money creation and overall expansion in money 
supply, which lead to inﬂ ation. 
In this paper, we use a simple model to study the inﬂ ationary 
potential of ﬁ scal policy in India by estimating the long-run relationship 
and the short-run dynamics between ﬁ scal deﬁ cit, seigniorage and 
inﬂ ation. The motivation is that ﬁ scal deﬁ cit can lead to inﬂ ation either 
directly by raising the aggregate demand (demand pull inﬂ ation), or 
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indirectly through money creation, or a combination of both. Against 
this background, Section-II presents the challenges associated with 
ﬁ scal exit for advanced economies as well as EMEs, and highlights 
the issues that are particularly important for India. Section III explains 
brieﬂ y the analytical framework employed in the paper. In section IV, the 
estimation procedures are explained. The data and empirical results are 
analysed in section V. Section VI contains the concluding observations.
Section II
The Challenge of Fiscal Exit – What is Important for India?
The unprecedented stimulus that was used across countries to avert 
another Great Depression is widely believed to have shown the seeds 
of the next crisis. Public debt levels in the advanced economies are 
projected to explode to levels never seen during peace-time, leaving 
almost no ﬁ scal space for managing other shocks to the economies 
in future, besides signiﬁ cantly constraining normalisation of overall 
macroeconomic conditions. Some of the projected debt ﬁ gures look 
uncomfortably high – revealing in true sense the trade-offs involved 
in policy options. A better today ensured through policy interventions 
could enhance risks for the future. In the case of sub-prime crisis, the 
impact on the world economy will be permanent and is expected to 
persist over several decades through the channel of high public debt.
What then is the dimension of the challenge we are facing today? IMF 
projections indicate that in the G-20 advanced economies, Government 
debt would reach 118 per cent of GDP in 2014, which will be 40 per 
cent higher than the pre-crisis levels. Consolidating the level to about 
60 per cent of GDP by 2030 would require raising the average structural 
primary balance by 8 per cent of GDP, which is not easy, though not 
impossible. But this order of adjustment will involve other costs. One 
could ﬁ rst see why the adjustment options may not be easy, and then, 
what other costs could result from sustained high levels of public debt.
Why Debt Normalisation could be Diffi cult?
Many of the advanced economies were preparing their ﬁ scal 
conditions to face the challenges associated with demography when the 
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crisis unfolded. The pressure from demography on the ﬁ scal conditions 
in terms of social security needs and aging population will increase 
over time, whereas the crisis will leave behind additional pressure 
arising from the impact of lower potential output and patchy recovery 
on revenues and from high unemployment and jobless recovery on 
expenditure. Collapse in asset prices also seems to have affected the 
funded part of the social security systems. The plausible options for debt 
normalization include higher taxes, higher economic growth and the 
associated revenue buoyancy, lower expenditure or use of inﬂ ation tax. 
Many of the advanced economies already have higher tax/GDP ratios, 
and future increases in tax rates may also affect growth. Moreover, 
in a globalised world, higher taxes could shift economic activities to 
other parts of the world. Lower expenditure, given the constraint of 
aging population and high unemployment, and higher debt servicing 
associated with the higher debt, could be difﬁ cult. Higher economic 
growth, thus, could be the best possible option. Search for new sources 
of growth would be a key policy challenge, which has to be also seen in 
relation to the rising prominence of EMEs in the global economy and the 
competition they would provide in the search for higher productivity.
The Costs of Sustained High Levels of Public Debt
A critical part of the policy challenge associated with high public 
debt is to recognize upfront the costs for the economy, without being too 
alarmist. Some of the costs seem obvious, even though because of the 
non-linearity in the relationships between key evolving macroeconomic 
variables, it may not be easy to quantify them. Some of these obvious 
costs could be:
(a) Lack of ﬁ scal space to deal with future shocks, including future 
downturns in business cycles.
(b) Pressure on interest rates and crowding-out of resources from the 
private sector.  This effect is not visible as yet because of weak 
private demand and expansionary monetary policies. As private 
demand recovers and monetary policy cycles turn around, potential 
risks will materialize. Three speciﬁ c channels could exert pressure 
on the interest rate: (i) larger ﬁ scal imbalances would imply lower 
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domestic savings, (ii) increase in risk premia, as market would 
differentiate between debt levels and expect a premium in relation 
to the perceived risk, which is already evident after the experience 
of Dubai World and Greece, and (iii) higher inﬂ ation expectations 
that would invariably result from high levels of debt, which will be 
reﬂ ected in the nominal interest rates.
(c) Pressure on central banks to dilute their commitment to and focus 
on price stability. In this context, one may see the inﬂ ation tolerance 
levels of central banks rising. The IMF’s argument that raising the 
inﬂ ation target in advanced economies from 2 per cent to 4 per cent 
may not add signiﬁ cant distortions to the economies should also be 
carefully examined by central banks. One must recognise why some 
feel that return to pre-crisis levels of central bank independence 
with focus on price stability would be critical to improve the future 
macroeconomic conditions, given the large debt overhang. Price 
stability will be critical to ensure high growth, which in turn can 
effectively contribute to debt consolidation without imposing costs 
of adjustments through other options.  The extent of dilution of 
central bank independence may also increase if ﬁ nancial stability is 
made an explicit mandate of central banks.
How then to Approach Fiscal Exit?
In planning the approach to ﬁ scal exit, the scope for any 
complacency based on some misplaced arguments must be avoided. 
One such argument could be “no threshold level of debt could be risky”, 
given the experience of Japan, which has been operating with very high 
levels of debt for quite some time. One cannot ignore the fact that in 
Japan private demand has remained depressed for more than a decade, 
and much of the debt of the government is held internally as part of 
domestic savings. The second ﬂ awed argument could be that Dubai and 
Greece type shocks cannot cause any systemic global concern since 
these shocks are too insigniﬁ cant for the global economy. The most 
dangerous argument, though, could be to support “inﬂ ation tax” as a 
means to reduce the real debt burden, on the ground that the alternative 
option of higher taxes could be equally distortionary. IMF estimates 
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indicate that higher inﬂ ation in advanced economies at about 6 per cent 
maintained over ﬁ ve years could reduce the real debt burden by about 
25 per cent (IMF, 2009).
The ﬁ scal exit plans, thus, must involve clarity and commitment. 
The broad contours of such strategies may have to emphasise: (a) 
medium-term ﬁ scal framework, (b) credible commitment, (c) adoption 
of ﬁ scal rules – with scope for deviations to deal with future shocks, 
including cyclical slowdowns, and (d) clarity in communication.
Why Fiscal Exit in EMEs Could be Different?
EMEs entered the global crisis with much better ﬁ scal space, 
as ﬁ scal discipline was seen generally as a critical aspect of sound 
macroeconomic environment to support higher growth. Since the 
ﬁ nancial sector of the EMEs did not require any ofﬁ cial bailout, the 
magnitude of ﬁ scal support needed during the global crisis was also not 
as high as in the advanced economies. More importantly, with stronger 
recovery ahead of the advanced economies, EMEs can implement ﬁ scal 
exit faster without creating concerns for growth. Stronger recovery 
in growth will also improve revenue buoyancy. EMEs have to be 
particularly careful about ﬁ scal exit, unlike in advanced economies, 
since ﬁ scal indiscipline has conventionally created other problems such 
as high current account deﬁ cit, pressures on inﬂ ation, crowding-out 
concerns and even capital outﬂ ows. The ﬁ scal exit challenges in EMEs, 
thus, will be different from those in the advanced economies.
Fiscal Exit in India
India was on a sustained path of ﬁ scal consolidation prior to the 
global crisis, conditioned by the discipline embodied in the Fiscal 
Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act, 2003. The 
FRBM rules required phased reduction in ﬁ scal deﬁ cit to 3 per cent of 
GDP by end March-2009, with commitment to also eliminate revenue 
deﬁ cit by that time. The progress on ﬁ scal consolidation turned out to be 
faster than initially expected, as high growth during the ﬁ ve year period 
2003-08 ensured better revenue buoyancy. Fiscal deﬁ cit as percentage 
of GDP fell from 4.5 per cent in 2003-04 to 2.6 per cent in 2007-08, 
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leading to attainment of the target one year before what was initially 
set under the FRBM rules in 2004. Revenue deﬁ cit also declined from 
3.6 per cent of GDP to 1.1 per cent of GDP during the corresponding 
period. The FRBM, thus, had created considerable ﬁ scal space, led by 
revenue buoyancy, when the impact of the global recession on domestic 
activities warranted introduction of anti-crisis ﬁ scal response.   Some 
have viewed the ﬁ scal consolidation as a favourable macroeconomic 
condition that contributed to India’s shift to the higher growth trajectory, 
even though it is a fact that ﬁ scal consolidation resulted primarily 
because of high growth.
When the global crisis started to spread, despite perceptions of 
decoupling and a sound ﬁ nancial system at home, there was a clear 
risk of slowdown in Indian growth, which had to be arrested through 
the appropriate policy response. Because of the heightened uncertainty, 
and the “black swan” nature of the series of adverse developments 
that unfolded after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the Indian 
policy response had to be swift and signiﬁ cant, with a heavy accent 
on adequate precaution.  Two major ﬁ scal decisions that were taken 
earlier, i.e., the farm debt waiver scheme and the Sixth Pay Commission 
award, worked like expansionary stimulus, where the decision lag was 
almost zero, since the decisions had been taken and partly implemented 
even before the crisis-led need for ﬁ scal stimulus was recognised. The 
subsequent crisis related ﬁ scal stimulus was delivered  in the form of tax 
cuts as well as higher expenditure, dominated by revenue expenditure, 
as the deceleration in private consumption expenditure turned out to 
be signiﬁ cant, which needed to be partly offset by higher government 
expenditure. Reﬂ ecting the expansionary ﬁ scal stance – involving 
a deliberate deviation from the ﬁ scal consolidation path – the ﬁ scal 
deﬁ cit of the Central Government rose from 2.6 per cent of GDP in 
2007-08 to 5.9 percent in 2008-09 and further to 6.7 per cent in 2009-10. 
Even the State Governments, which were progressing well on ﬁ scal 
consolidation – driven partly by the incentives from the Twelfth Finance 
Commission – experienced a setback to the process, resulting primarily 
from pressures on revenues and central transfers associated with the 
economic slowdown as well as the compelling demand to match the 
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pay revision already announced for Central Government employees. 
Gross ﬁ scal deﬁ cit of the states, which had improved to 1.5 per cent of 
GDP by 2007-08, expanded to 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2009-10.
The role of the expansionary ﬁ scal stance adopted by both the 
Central and the State Governments has to be seen in the context of 
the fact that private consumption demand, which accounts for close 
to 60 per cent of aggregate demand, exhibited sharp deceleration in 
growth, from 9.8 per cent in 2007-08 to 6.8 per cent and 4.1 per cent 
in the subsequent two years. Government consumption expenditure, 
which accounts for just about 10 per cent of aggregate demand, had to 
be stepped up signiﬁ cantly to partially offset the impact of the sharp 
deceleration in the growth of private consumption demand. Reﬂ ecting 
the ﬁ scal stimulus, growth in government consumption expenditure was 
as high as 16.7 per cent in 2008-09, as a result of which the contribution 
of government expenditure to the overall growth in aggregate demand 
rose almost three fold – from 10.4 per cent in 2007-08 to 33.6 per cent 
in 2008-09.  The ﬁ scal stance, thus, had a clear role in arresting sharper 
slowdown in economic growth.
Given the possibility of a weak ﬁ scal position operating as a 
drag on economic growth in the medium-run – through crowding-out 
pressures, besides the scope for causing higher inﬂ ation – the need for 
faster return to ﬁ scal consolidation path was recognised quite early in 
India, which was articulated and emphasised by the Reserve Bank in 
its policy statements, as signs of stronger recovery in growth started 
to emerge. By the time the Budget for 2010-11 was announced in 
February 2010, better evidence on broad-based momentum in recovery 
created the space for gradual roll back of some of the ﬁ scal measures 
that were taken in response to the crisis. At the macro level, while gross 
ﬁ scal deﬁ cit has been budgeted lower at 5.5 per cent of GDP, net market 
borrowing programme has also been scaled down by more than 10 per 
cent. In terms of speciﬁ c measures, some of the stimulus-led tax cuts 
have been rolled back, greater non-tax revenue from disinvestments and 
auction of 3-G/BWA spectrum has been realised and growth in non-plan 
expenditure has been signiﬁ cantly curtailed to 4.1 per cent in 2010-11 
from 26.0 per cent in the previous year, much of which will result from 
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rationalisation of subsidies. More importantly, indicating the resolve to 
return to the ﬁ scal consolidation process, a Medium Term Fiscal Policy 
Statement (MTFPS) has been issued along with plans for tax reforms, 
both direct and indirect. As per the MTFPS, there will be annual rolling 
targets for revenue deﬁ cit and gross ﬁ scal deﬁ cit so as to reach 2.7 
per cent and 4.1 per cent of GDP, respectively, by 2012-13. Goods and 
Services Tax (GST) and Direct Tax Code (DTC), to be implemented 
in 2011-12, will be critical components of the ﬁ scal consolidation, 
which could help in improving the tax to GDP ratio from 10.8 per cent 
in 2010-11 to 11.8 per cent in 2012-13. Reﬂ ecting the planned ﬁ scal 
consolidation, total debt liabilities of the Central Government could 
also be expected to moderate from 51.5 per cent of GDP in 2009-10 to 
48.2 per cent of GDP in 2012-13. The Indian approach to ﬁ scal exit – in 
terms of both adoption of speciﬁ c ﬁ scal consolidation measures in sync 
with the recovery and announcement of medium-term targets for phased 
consolidation – reﬂ ects the recognition in the sphere of policy-making 
of the importance of a disciplined ﬁ scal   environment for sustainable 
high growth.
The quality of ﬁ scal adjustment, however, must receive greater 
attention, given the medium-term double digit growth objective. Like 
the previous phase of ﬁ scal consolidation during 2004-08, stronger 
recovery in growth will improve revenue buoyancy. Moreover, given 
the fact that a large part of the government borrowing (excluding the part 
invested by FIIs) is ﬁ nanced domestically, the sovereign risk concerns 
would also remain contained. These favourable aspects, however, 
should not dilute the focus on consolidation from the expenditure side. 
Even if gross ﬁ scal deﬁ cit for 2010-11 has been budgeted to decline to 
5.5 per cent of GDP from 6.7 per cent in the previous year, that may not 
signal any major move in the direction of structural consolidation, if 
one removes the one-off components from the revenue and expenditure 
sides. Adjusted for  disinvestment and 3-G/BWA auction proceeds  on 
the revenue side, and farm debt waiver and Sixth Pay Commission 
arrears on the expenditure side, the reduction in gross ﬁ scal deﬁ cit as 
per cent of GDP would be much less, i.e. by 0.3 percent  as against 1.2 
percent envisaged in the Budget. The magnitude and quality of ﬁ scal 
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adjustment could have a signiﬁ cant conditioning inﬂ uence on India’s 
medium-term growth prospects. 
In the absence of faster and better quality ﬁ scal adjustment, at least 
four major risks to macroeconomic conditions could be envisaged: (a) 
the decline in domestic savings, led by the fall in public sector savings, 
which will lower the potential output path, (b) higher overall interest 
rates, when the revival in demand for credit from the private sector starts 
competing with the borrowing programme of the government, (c)  limit 
the capacity to manage the exchange rate and the  domestic liquidity 
impact of possible surges in capital ﬂ ows, since the use of sterilisation 
options like the MSS could exert further pressures on the interest rates, 
and thereby lead to even higher inﬂ ows, and (d) may even force reversal 
of reforms, such as use of higher SLR requirements for banks or even 
introduction of SLR for non-banking entities in the ﬁ nancial system 
to create a captive market for the government borrowing programme. 
These possible potential implications signify why ﬁ scal discipline is 
so critical in a market based economy. Often, in the search for easy 
solutions, direct or indirect monetisation could be preferred, which in 
turn could give rise to higher inﬂ ation. This paper primarily highlights 
the inﬂ ation risks to India from the ﬁ scal imbalance, and argues that 
ﬁ scal space is as critical for managing inﬂ ation as for stabilising the 
output path. 
Section III
The Analytical Framework
 Inﬂ ation, according to monetarists, is always and everywhere a 
monetary phenomenon. Following the seminal contribution by Sargent 
and Wallace (1981), however, it is viewed that ﬁ scally dominant 
governments running persistent deﬁ cits would sooner or later ﬁ nance 
those deﬁ cits through creation of money, which will have inﬂ ationary 
consequences. Fischer and Easterly (1990), thus, argue that rapid 
monetary growth may often be driven  by   underlying ﬁ scal imbalances, 
implying that rapid inﬂ ation is almost always a ﬁ scal phenomenon. 
Historical evidences have shown that governments often resorted 
to seigniorage (or inﬂ ation tax) during times of ﬁ scal stress, which 
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had inﬂ ationary consequences. Thus, contemporary macroeconomic 
literature, while trying to explain inﬂ ationary phenomenon has also 
focussed on the ﬁ scal behaviour, particularly in the developing country 
context. This is because ﬁ scally dominant regimes are often seen as 
a developing country phenomenon, due to less efﬁ cient tax systems 
and political instability, which lead to short-term crisis management at 
the cost of medium to long-term sustainability.  As noted by Cochrane 
(2009), “...Fiscal stimulus can be great politics, at least in the short-
run.” Furthermore, more limited access to external borrowing tends 
to lower the relative cost of seignorage in these countries, increasing 
their dependence on the inﬂ ation tax while delaying macroeconomic 
stabilisation (Alesina and Drazen, (1991) and Calvo and Vegh (1999)).
 The relationship between government deﬁ cit and inﬂ ation, 
however, is more often analysed from a long-term perspective. This 
is because borrowing allows governments to allocate seignorage 
inter-temporally, implying that ﬁ scal deﬁ cits and resort to inﬂ ation 
tax need not necessarily be contemporaneously correlated. The short-
run dynamics between inﬂ ation and deﬁ cit is also complicated by the 
possible feedback effect of inﬂ ation on the ﬁ scal balance (Catao and 
Terrones, 2001). In the short-run, the government might also switch 
to alternative sources of ﬁ nancing in relation to seigniorage so that the 
correlation between inﬂ ation, deﬁ cit and seigniorage is weakened.
 A popular method for analysing the inﬂ ationary potential of 
ﬁ scal deﬁ cit in India is through its direct impact on reserve money, 
which via the money multiplier leads to increase  in money supply, 
that in turn leads to inﬂ ation (for example, Khundrakpam and Goyal, 
2009). In this paper, we analyse the inﬂ ationary potential of ﬁ scal 
deﬁ cit by hypothesising that either: (i) there can be a direct impact on 
inﬂ ation through increase in aggregate demand; or (ii) through money 
creation or seigniorage; or (iii) a combination of both. The causality is 
described in the following ﬂ ow chart. In essence, though, one has to 
recognise that the increase in demand ﬁ nanced by ﬁ scal deﬁ cit would 
automatically lead to higher money supply through higher demand for 
money. In a Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) framework, increase 
in money demand associated with higher government demand has to 
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be accommodated, in order to keep the short-term interest rates in the 
system, in particular the overnight call rate, within the LAF (repo – 
reverse repo) corridor of interest rates. In a LAF based operating 
procedure of monetary policy, thus, money supply is demand driven, and 
hence endogenous. To the extent that ﬁ scal deﬁ cit leads to expansion in 
money supply, associated inﬂ ation risk must be seen as a ﬁ scal, rather 
than a monetary phenomenon.
In this paper, ﬁ scal deﬁ cit (D) is deﬁ ned as total expenditure of 
the central government less the revenue receipts (including grants) 
less other non-debt capital receipts. In the literature, primary deﬁ cit, 
which is ﬁ scal deﬁ cit less interest payments, is also often considered 
in analysing the inﬂ ationary impact of government deﬁ cit in order to 
remove any possible endogeneity bias resulting from the reverse impact 
of inﬂ ation on nominal interest rate. 
Seigniorage, which is often referred to as the inﬂ ation tax, could 
be deﬁ ned for simple empirical analysis as the change in reserve money 
scaled by the price level. The price level is measured by the wholesale 
price index. Thus, seigniorage ‘S’ is deﬁ ned as,
S = {RM – RM(-1)}/P
Where,  RM is the reserve money or base money and P is the index of 
price level. 
 So,  we essentially empirically test the following:
i) P = f(D)
ii) P = f(S)
iii) S = f(D)
iv) P = f(D,S)
Fiscal Deﬁ cit
Seigniorage
Inﬂ ation
Inﬂ ation Tax
Demand Pressure
Money Creation
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It is important to note here that ∆RM could be driven by increase 
in net foreign assets (NFA) of the RBI as well as net RBI credit to the 
government. Under ﬁ scal dominance, much of the increase in RM could 
be because of increase in net RBI credit to the government. Under an 
exchange rate policy that aims at avoiding excessive volatility, surges in 
capital ﬂ ows and the associated increase in NFA of the RBI could drive 
the growth in RM from the sources side. As a result, inﬂ ation may still 
exhibit a stronger relationship with money growth, but the underlying 
driving factors behind money growth could be the ﬁ scal stance and the 
exchange rate policy.
Section IV
The Empirical Framework
We employ bounds test or ARDL approach to cointegration analysis 
developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) to examine the stated 
empirical hypotheses above. The advantages of this approach are that, 
ﬁ rst, it can be applied to variables integrated of different order. Second, 
unlike residual based cointegration analysis, the unrestricted error 
correction model (UECM) employed in bounds test does not push the 
short-run dynamics into the residual terms. Third, the bounds test can 
be applied to small sample size. Fourth, it identiﬁ es the exact variable 
to be normalised in the long-run relationship. A limitation of bounds 
test, however, is that it is not appropriate in situations where there may 
be more than one long-run relationship among the variables. In other 
words, the test is appropriate only when one variable is explained by the 
remaining variables and not the vice versa. 
This test involves investigating the existence of a long-run 
relationship among the variables using an unrestricted error-correction 
model (UECM). In the case of two variables, the UECM would take the 
following form:
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∆ is the ﬁ rst difference operator. The bounds test for the presence 
of long-run relationship can be conducted using F-test. The F statistic 
tests the null hypothesis that the coefﬁ cients of the lagged levels of the 
variables are jointly equal to zero, against the alternative that they are 
jointly different from zero. In (1), where ‘X’ is the dependent variable, 
F-test for the null hypothesis for cointegration between the two variables 
with ‘Y’ as the long-run forcing variable is (H0: βx = γx = 0) against the 
alternative hypothesis (H1 : βx≠ γx ≠ 0), denoted by Fx(X/Y). Where ‘Y’ 
is the dependent variable in (2), the null hypothesis is (H0: βy = γy = 0) 
against the alternative hypothesis (H1: βy ≠ γy ≠ 0), denoted by Fy(Y/X). 
In the case of three variables, UECM would take the following 
form:
When ‘X’ is the dependent variable, F-test for the null hypothesis 
for cointegration amongst the three variables, with ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ as 
the long-run forcing variables, is (H0 : αx = βx = γx = 0) against the 
alternative hypothesis (H1 : αx ≠ βx ≠ γx ≠ 0), denoted by Fx(X/Y,Z). 
Where ‘Y’ is the dependent variable, the similar null hypothesis, with 
the ‘X’ and ‘Z’ as the long-run forcing variable, is (H0 : αy = βy = γy = 
0) against the alternative hypothesis (H1 : αy ≠ βy ≠ γy ≠ 0), denoted by 
FY(Y/X,Z). With ‘Z’ as the dependent variable, the similar hypothesis is 
the null of (H0 : αz = βz = γz = 0) against (H1 : αz ≠ βz ≠ γz ≠ 0), denoted 
by FZ(Z/X,Y). However, as mentioned above, for this approach to be 
valid, there must be only one unique cointegrating relationship among 
the variables i.e., only one of the variables should be explained by the 
remaining variables without any reverse causal relationships. 
The F-test has a non-standard distribution which depends upon: 
(i) whether variables included in the ARDL model are I(1) or I(0); (ii) 
whether the ARDL model contains an intercept and/or a trend. There 
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are critical bound values of both the statistics set by the properties of 
the regressors into purely I(1) or I(0), which are provided in Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (2001) for large sample size. The critical bound values 
for F-test in the case of small sample size are estimated in Narayan 
(2005). If the absolute value of the estimated F-statistics: (i) lie in 
between the critical bounds set by I(1) and I(0), cointegration between 
the variables is inconclusive; (ii) in absolute value lower than set by 
I(0), cointegration is rejected; and iii) in absolute value higher than set 
by I(1), cointegration is accepted.
For the equation which shows cointegrating relationship, the 
conditional long-run relationship is estimated by the reduced form 
solution of the following ARDL equations. If ‘X’ is the explained 
variable the speciﬁ cation takes the form:
The short dynamics are obtained from the following ARDL speciﬁ cations
The ECT term in (7) is the error obtained from the long-run 
relationship in (6).
The error correction model described by (7) can be used to 
generate dynamic forecast of the explained variable based on the past 
and current values of the independent variables. The accurateness of 
the dynamic forecast could indicate the robustness of the estimated 
model.
Section V
Data and Empirical Results
 We cover the time period 1953 to 2009. The relevant data on 
price (wholesale price index) and reserve money are obtained from 
Monetary Statistics and Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 
RBI. Data on Central Government ﬁ scal deﬁ cit from 1971 onwards 
are obtained from Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, while 
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that for the earlier period was taken from Pattnaik et al (1999). Two 
time periods were considered, mainly with the purpose of generating 
dynamic forecast and checking the robustness of the model. The ﬁ rst 
time period is from 1953 to 2005, which excludes the post-FRBM 
period when direct lending to Government by the RBI was discontinued 
under the FRBM Act.
Unit Root Tests
To gauge the appropriateness of the ARDL cointegration analysis, 
two unit root tests viz., ADF test and PP test were conducted for the two 
sample periods. It was found that there are contradictions in the unit 
root properties based on the alternative tests for the price variable and 
between the two sample periods on government deﬁ cit. On the other 
hand, seigniorage is indicated to be a stationary series by both the tests 
and for  both the sample periods. The overall picture that emerged was 
that the three variables considered are not necessarily integrated of the 
same order (Table 1). In view of this, we used bounds tests, which are 
valid when variables are integrated of different order (Pesharan, Shin 
and Smith, 2001).
Bounds Tests
Bounds test results are extremely sensitive to the presence of 
serial correlation and the lag length selected. In order to remove the 
Table 1: Unit Root Tests
Variable (X)                ADF                  PP
 X ∆X X ∆X
1953 to 2005     
LogP -3.21(t) -5.20* -4.94(t)* -6.22*
LogS -5.59(t)* -8.93* 5.60(t)* -24.4*
LogD -3.10(t) -6.96* -3.16(t) -6.98*
1953 to 2009     
LogP -2.93(t) -6.43* -4.36(t)* -6.44*
LogS -5.50(t)* -9.09* 5.53(t)* -24.6*
LogD -3.58(t)** -6.82* -3.63(t)** -6.69*
Note: * and ** denote statistical signiﬁ cance at 1% an d 5% levels, respectively, ‘t’ 
in parentheses denote that the tests included a trend along with the constant.
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possible presence of serial correlations, dummies were included to 
remove outliers. With price as the explained variable, the outliers 
were found in 1974 and 1975 coinciding with the after affects of oil 
price shock of 1973. Fiscal deﬁ cit outliers were found in 1955 and 
2009, coinciding with the initiation of the Second Five Year Plan and 
the recent ﬁ scal stimulus measures following economic slowdown 
due to the global ﬁ nancial crisis, respectively. The outliers with 
respect to seigniorage were found during the years of 1975, 1976 and 
1977, which were the years of extreme volatility in prices and money 
growth. Given the use of annual data, the maximum lag length was 
set at 2 and the appropriate lag length was selected based on SBC 
criterion.1 This was considered appropriate since the sample size is 
small (in the statistical sense) and therefore including too many lags 
may lead to loss of explanatory power.
The bounds test results among the variables during both the sample 
periods reported in table-2 reveal the following: 
(i) Between price and seigniorage, the F-statistics are above the 
95% critical bound values (9.74 and 7.18 for the two sample 
periods) and signiﬁ cant at 99% critical level only when price 
is explained by seigniorage. The F-statistics for the reverse 
relationships (3.13 and 2.67) are statistically insigniﬁ cant. In 
other words, there exists a long-run cointegrating relationship 
between price level in the economy and government resorting to 
seignorage to ﬁ nance its deﬁ cits, but with the former only being 
caused by the latter; 
(ii) Between price and government deﬁ cit, the F-statistics for the two 
sample periods are 6.17 and 7.96 and statistically signiﬁ cant only 
when price is explained by government deﬁ cit. In the case of the 
reverse relationship, the F-statistics are 3.34 and 2.27 and are lower 
than 95% critical bound values and hence not signiﬁ cant. Thus, in 
the long-run, government deﬁ cit has an impact on price level in the 
economy, but the reverse impact is insigniﬁ cant; 
(iii) Seigniorage is also explained by government deﬁ cit with 
F-statistics of 8.14 and 5.32 for the two sample periods, but the 
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reverse relationships are not statistically signiﬁ cant, given the 
corresponding F-statistics of 0.39 and 0.48. The implication is 
that government resorts to seigniorage to ﬁ nance its deﬁ cit in the 
long-run, but there is no signiﬁ cant reverse impact.
(iv) When all the three variables are combined, only price is explained 
by seigniorage and government deﬁ cit with F-statistics of 6.42 and 
5.83 for the two sample periods. None of the reverse relationships 
are statistically signiﬁ cant. The respective F-statistics for the two 
sample periods are 2.51 and 1.85 with government deﬁ cit as the 
explained variable and 0.83 and 0.56 with seigniorage as the 
explained variable. In other words, ceteris paribus, price level in 
the economy in India, in the long-run, is signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uenced 
either directly by deﬁ cit itself or through the creation of money 
via deﬁ cit ﬁ nancing, or a combination of both. In other words, 
inﬂ ation is indicated to be explained by government deﬁ cit 
either directly or through seigniorage indirectly or through a 
combination of both the factors. Further, the results that there 
is only one cointegrating relationship between the variables in 
all the alternative combinations clearly indicates that the ARDL 
approach to cointegration  can be used for estimation of the long-
run relationships and the short-run dynamics.2
Long-run Coeffi cients
In estimating the  long-run coefﬁ cients a trend component was 
included in the price equations as a proxy to capture the impact 
of other macroeconomic variables on price. The results presented 
in table-3 reveal some interesting features. While  the signs of the 
coefﬁ cients are as expected a priori in all the equations, some of them 
are not statistically signiﬁ cant. Speciﬁ cally, the coefﬁ cients of ﬁ scal 
deﬁ cit in the price equations are insigniﬁ cant in the shorter sample 
period (column 2 and 4), but turn signiﬁ cant in the full sample period 
(column 6 and 8). Conversely, the coefﬁ cients of seiniorage which 
are signiﬁ cant in the shorter sample period (column 1 and 4) turn 
insigniﬁ cant in the full sample period, particularly with the inclusion 
of ﬁ scal deﬁ cit as the other explanatory variable (column 5 and 8). 
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This could indicate that till the ban on direct government borrowing 
from the RBI, the inﬂ ationary impact of ﬁ scal deﬁ cit worked primarily 
through money creation and overshadowed the direct  impact, if any. 
However, in recent years, with limited scope for direct monetisation, 
the inﬂ ationary impact of ﬁ scal deﬁ cit is generated more directly 
perhaps via the channel of increase in aggregate demand.   
Individually, one percent increases in seigniorage leads to about 
one-third of a percent increase in the price level in both sample periods, 
though the level of statistical signiﬁ cance declines (column 1 and 5). 
With regard to ﬁ scal deﬁ cit, one per cent increase in it leads to about 
Table 2: Bounds test for Cointegration
Functional 
Relationship
1952-2005 1952-2009
F-Statistics
95% 
critical 
Values
Dummy 
variables
F-Statistics
95% 
critical 
Values
Dummy 
variables
Bivariates
Fp (P/S) 9.74* 4.44
1974 & 
1975
7.18* 4.393 1974 & 1975
Fs(S/P) 3.13 4.44 2.67 4.393
Fp (P/D) 6.71* 4.44
1974 & 
1975
7.96* 4.393 1974 & 1975
Fd(D/P) 3.34 4.44 1955 2.27 4.393 1955 & 2009
Fs(S/D) 8.14* 4.44
 1975, 1976 
& 1977
5.32** 4.393
1975, 1976 
& 1977
Fd(D/S) 0.39 4.44 0.48 4.393 2009
Trivariates
Fp (P/S,D) 6.42* 4.178
1974 & 
1975
5.83* 4.10 1974 & 1975
Fd(D/S,P) 2.51 4.178 1.85 4.10  2009
Fs(S/D,P) 0.83 4.178
1959 & 
1997
0.56 4.10 1959 & 1997
Note:  * and ** denote statistical signiﬁ cance at 99% and 95% critical levels, 
respectively. The critical bound values for F-statistics are from Narayan (2005).
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one-ﬁ fth to one-quarter of a per cent increase in the price level, which 
though is statistically signiﬁ cant only for the full sample period (column 
2 and 6). 
The above estimated elasticities, however, ignore the interaction 
between seigniorage and government deﬁ cit. It is seen from column 
(3) and (7) that to ﬁ nance one percent of ﬁ scal deﬁ cit in the long-run, 
seigniorage increased by about 0.48 to 0.51 percent, with other things 
remaining the same.
Combining both government deﬁ cit and seigniorage,one percent 
increase in seigniorage was found to cause inﬂ ation by about one-
ﬁ fth of  a percent in both the sample periods, but is not statistically 
signiﬁ cant for the full period. With regard to one per cent increase 
in government deﬁ cit, the impact which was small (0.13) and not 
statistically signiﬁ cant in the shorter sample period, increased in the 
full sample period to a statistically signiﬁ cant level of about a quarter 
of a percent increase in the price level. It may, thus, be interpreted 
that, in the more recent years, the direct long-run inﬂ ationary impact 
Table 3: Long-run Coeffi cients
1954-2005 1954-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LogP LogP LogS LogP LogP LogP LogS LogP
Constant 4.50(21.6)*
3.30
(5.4)*
-3.01
(-12.8)*
3.75
(6.4)*
4.53
(17.6)*
3.0
(5.1)*
-3.18
(-10.7)*
3.23
(5.3)*
LogS 0.31(2.1)**
0.23
(1.8)***
0.32
(1.7)***
0.2
(1.3)
LogD 0.19(1.5)
0.483
(19.3)*
0.13
(1.2)
0.25
(2.1)**
0.51
(16.6)*
0.24
(2.1)**
Trend 0.06(6.1)*
0.05
(3.3)*
0.05
(3.4)*
0.05
(4.0)*
0.04
(2.9)*
DumP 0.71(0.71)**
0.79
(2.6)*
0.67
(2.5)**
0.90
(2.64)**
0.93
(2.2)*
DumS1 -.97(-3.2)*
-1.25
(-2.85)*
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁ cance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dummy as indicated in the bounds test.
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of seigniroage has declined while that of government deﬁ cit through 
aggregate demand channel has increased. However, the long-run 
impact of government deﬁ cit on seigniorage revenue appears to have 
not declined. 
Short-run Dynamics
The short-run dynamics presented in Table-4 reveal that all the 
equations are stable i.e., they converge to the long-run equilibrium 
as indicated by the negative sign of the error correction term. The 
explanatory powers are reasonable and the problem of serial correlation 
is within the tolerable level in general. There, however, seems to be 
some decline in the explanatory power after the inclusion of more 
recent periods.
The inﬂ ationary impact of seigniorage in the short-run is neglisible, 
irrespective of whether it is considered alone or taken together with 
government deﬁ cit in the model in both the sample periods (columns 
1, 4, 5 and 8). The speed of convergence following a shock is also very 
slow, about 16 to 17 percent in a single year when considered alone and 
about 16 to 20 percent when deﬁ cit is also included.
Government deﬁ cit, on the other hand, has a positive impact on 
inﬂ ation even in the short-run for the full sample period indicating that 
the direct inﬂ ationary impact of government deﬁ cit could have become 
more prominent in the more recent years.
With regard to the impact of government deﬁ cit on seigniorage, 
there is a strong positive impact even in the short-run. The impact was 
larger in the shorter sample period and the speed of convergence was 
also  higher with about 92 per cent of the divergence from the long-run 
equilibrium following a shock being corrected in a single time period. 
Both the short-run impact and speed of convergence decline in the full 
sample period, indicating that government may have  switched over 
to alternative source of ﬁ nancing its deﬁ cit in the short-run given the 
restriction on direct borrowing from the RBI since the beginning of 
ﬁ scal 2006.
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Table 4: Short-run Dynamics
1954-2005 1954-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆LogP ∆LogP ∆LogS ∆LogP ∆LogP ∆LogP ∆LogS ∆LogP
Constant 0.79(3.1)*
0.62
(2.7)*
-2.78
(-5.3)*
0.75
(3.1)*
0.73
(2.8)*
0.52
(2.5)**
-2.38
(-4.26)*
0.51
(2.2)**
∆LogP-1
0.33
(2.4)**
∆LogS 0.00(0.01)
0.29
(2.6)**
-0.00
(-0.2)
-0.01
(0.61)
0.24
(1.96)***
-0.00
(-0.6)
∆LogD 0.04(1.5)
0.45
(5.9)*
0.03
(1.1)
0.04
(2.2)**
0.38
(4.8)*
0.04
(1.9)***
Trend 0.01(2.0)**
0.01
(2.2)**
0.01
(1.9)***
0.01
(1.6)
0.01
(1.9)***
0.00
(1.1)
DumP 0.12(4.6)*
0.15
(4.5)*
0.13
(4.7)*
0.16
(5.0)*
0.15
(5.2)*
DumS1 -0.90(-4.0)*
-0.94
(-3.8)*
ECM(-1) -0.17(-2.76)*
-0.19
(-3.4)*
-0.92
(-4.93)*
-0.20
(-2.97)**
-0.16
(-2.43)*
-0.127
(-3.27)*
-0.75
(-5.17)*
-0.16
(-2.42)**
R-bar 
Square 0.52 0.40 0.57 0.52 0.27 0.40 0.46 0.47
DW-
Statistics 1.75 1.65 1.88 1.73 2.02 1.64 1.82 1.64
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁ cance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  Dummy as indicated in the bounds test.
As mentioned above, dynamic forecasts of inﬂ ation for the period 
2006 to 2009 were generated from the models estimated for the period 
1953 to 2005 and then compared with the actual change. The forecast 
results are presented in Table-5. It could be seen that the direction 
of actual inﬂ ation are correctly predicted irrespective of whether 
seigniorage and government deﬁ cit are combined or considered 
individually. However, the inﬂ ation rates in each of the four years 
are over-predicted  The root mean square errors of predictions for the 
forecast period are also marginally higher than for the estimation period, 
except  when government deﬁ cit is considered as the only explanatory 
variable. However, root mean square errors are about or less than 5.0 
per cent, indicating that the forecast performance may be reasonable. 
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Table 5: Dynamic Forecasts for 2006 to 2009
(in per cent)
Change in P due to 
change in S and D
Change in P due to
change in S
Change in P due to 
change in D
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
2006 4.28 8.8 4.28 9.67 4.28 8.1
2007 5.28 8.7 5.28 9.97 5.28 7.5
2008 4.65 9.4 4.65 11.2 4.65 6.7
2009 8.01 13.0 8.01 12.6 8.01 9.7
Root mean 
square
Estimation 
Period
Forecast 
period
Estimation 
Period
Forecast 
period
Estimation 
Period
Forecast 
period
3.3 4.4 3.3 5.3 3.9 2.6
Section VI
Concluding Observations
The ﬁ scal response in India to the severe contagion from the global 
crisis was conditioned by the need to minimize the adverse impact on 
the domestic economy. In the process, however, India’s ﬁ scal deﬁ cit 
expanded again to the pre-FRBM level. Given India’s past experience, 
in terms of ﬁ scal consolidation resulting only over a number of years, 
downward inﬂ exibility of the post-crisis high ﬁ scal deﬁ cit level could 
emerge as a potential source of risk to India’s future path of inﬂ ation.
During 2008-10, when the ﬁ scal stimulus led to increase in the 
ﬁ scal deﬁ cit level, India’s inﬂ ation environment remained highly 
volatile, reaching a peak in 2008-09 under the inﬂ uence of the global 
oil and commodity prices shock, and coming under pressure again in 
2009-10 from another supply shock, but from within the country, in the 
form of signiﬁ cant increase in food prices resulting from the deﬁ cient 
monsoon. In this inﬂ ation process over these two years,  however, 
ﬁ scal deﬁ cit did not have much of a contributing role, since: (a) the 
overall private demand remained depressed, and ﬁ scal expansion only 
aimed at partially offsetting  the impact of deceleration in the growth 
of private consumption and investment demand on economic growth, 
(b)  large borrowing programme of the Government did not lead to 
high money growth, since the growth in demand for credit from the 
private sector exhibited signiﬁ cant deceleration, and (c) certain ﬁ scal 
measures like  cuts in indirect tax rates in fact helped in lowering the 
prices of speciﬁ c goods and services to some extent. Thus, the usual 
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two channels through which ﬁ scal deﬁ cit could cause inﬂ ation - i.e. by 
exerting pressure on aggregate demand in relation to potential output 
and by leading to excessive expansion in money growth  -  were almost 
absent. As demand for credit from the private sector has revived, and if 
capital inﬂ ows remain strong on a sustained basis, the usual downward 
inﬂ exibility in ﬁ scal deﬁ cit and its implications for the future inﬂ ation 
path will start to emerge over time.
In this context, this paper examined the empirical relationship 
between ﬁ scal deﬁ cit and inﬂ ation over the pre-FRBM period 1953-
2005 as well as the full sample period of 1953-2009. The direct impact of 
ﬁ scal deﬁ cit through primary expansion in reserve money was studied by 
using a concept of ‘seigniorage’, proxied by the annual change in reserve 
money deﬂ ated by WPI inﬂ ation.Net RBI credit to the government and 
RBI’s increase in net foreign assets are the two key determinants of 
growth in reserve money on the sources side, and hence, only part of 
the increase in reserve money could be ascribed to the ﬁ scal stance at 
any point of time. The overall impact of the ﬁ scal deﬁ cit on inﬂ ation, in 
turn, could operate through both increases in aggregate demand as well 
as associated growth in broad money. In both direct as well as overall 
analysis, thus, the role of money in inﬂ ation becomes obvious, but that 
process could be signiﬁ cantly conditioned by the ﬁ scal stance.
Bounds test results presented in the study suggest that: (a) there 
is a cointgrating relationship between the price level and seigniorage 
ﬁ nancing of deﬁ cit; (b) ﬁ scal deﬁ cit and price level also exhibit a similar 
relationship, and in both cases the price level appears to be determined 
by seigniorage or ﬁ scal deﬁ cit, not the other way round; (c) the role 
of seigniorage in the inﬂ ation process may be declining over time, 
particularly in recent years, even though the impact of ﬁ scal deﬁ cit on 
inﬂ ation through aggregate demand channel might have increased; (d) 
one percentage point increase in the level of ﬁ scal deﬁ cit is estimated 
to cause as much as a quarter of a percentage point increase in WPI; 
and (e) as per the analysis of short term dynamics through which ﬁ scal 
deﬁ cit may get transmitted to inﬂ ation, ﬁ scal deﬁ cit appears to have 
a positive impact on inﬂ ation even in the short-run, though modest. 
These empirical ﬁ ndings suggest that while the ﬁ scal stance in India 
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was appropriate in the context of the economic slowdown that followed 
in response to the global crisis, it may have medium-term potential 
ramiﬁ cations for the inﬂ ationary situation. This possibility, in turn, 
highlights the signiﬁ cance of return to ﬁ scal consolidation path at the 
earliest, with an emphasis on the quality of ﬁ scal adjustment, driven 
by rationalisation of expenditure rather than revenue buoyancy from 
stronger growth. Build up of adequate ﬁ scal space is important not only 
for ensuring stability to the high growth objective but also for enhancing 
the ability to deal with such inﬂ ationary pressures that may originate 
from temporary supply shocks, as experienced in recent few years.
Notes:
1   It was, however, found that increasing the maximum lag length to 3 or 4 
hardly affected the results.
2  As mentioned above, for Bounds test to be valid, the  long-run relationship 
between the variables should be only in one direction.
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